Economic and organizational sociologists have increasingly demonstrated that the actions of individuals and firms are affected by the social networks within which they are embedded. In recent years scholars have begun to recognize that the effects of these social networks may vary across populations or types of relations. In this paper we examine the extent to which the effects of interfirm networks on the behavior of firms are historically contingent. Focusing on the level of debt financing among approximately 140 large U.S. corporations over a 22-year period, we show that the extent to which the firms' behavior was influenced by those with which they were tied through director interlocks declined over time. We argue that this decline in the network effect reflected a shift in the institutional environment within which the firms operated. We conclude that corporate financing is socially embedded, but this embeddedness is historically contingent.
The idea that economic action can only be fully understood by an examination of the social relations within which actors are embedded has become a widely accepted staple of sociological thought (Granovetter 1985) . In the past two decades, sociologists and organizational theorists have provided a broad range of support for this formulation.
At the firm level, researchers have demonstrated the effects of interfirm ties on a range of firm strategies and outcomes, including mergers and acquisitions (Haunschild 1993; Stearns and Allan 1996; Palmer and Barber 2001) , adoption of the multidivisional form (Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou 1993) , takeover defense strategies (Davis 1991) , and firm survival (Uzzi 1996) . At the individual level, researchers have shown that the structure of an actor's personal network can affect his or her ability to achieve rapid promotion (Burt 1992; Podolny and Baron 1997) as well as success in task performance (Mizruchi and Stearns 2001) .
These studies have gone far in demonstrating that networks matter, but they have contained the seeds of something more: that the extent to which networks matter varies across actors and situations. Burt (1997) , for example, showed that the sparse personal networks that facilitated the rapid promotion of male managers had the opposite effect for women. Women experienced greater upward mobility when they attached themselves to an older male sponsor who could confer legitimacy on them. Podolny and Baron (1997) suggested that whether a sparse or dense personal network was helpful to a manager varied depending on the type of network. For ties based on the exchange of information and resources, sparse networks yielded superior mobility outcomes but for ties based on normative expectations and social support, dense networks produced greater success. At the firm level, Uzzi (1996) showed that the effect of strong social ties with one's business partners was associated with firm survival, but only up to a point. Beyond a certain threshold, social ties became a deterrent to survival. And Haunschild and Beckman (1998) showed that the extent to which director ties affected corporate acquisitions varied depending on the presence of alternate sources of information.
The above studies have shown that network effects differ for different groups of actors, and that the effects of network structures vary depending on the content and/or nature of the tie. What has not been established is that the effects of network structures on members of a group may vary over time. That is, it is possible that even within a particular type of network and a particular population of actors, the effect of the actors' networks may differ across periods, and under different institutional environments. In this paper we argue that the effect of interfirm social networks on firm behavior is historically contingent. Our site for this test is the use of debt financing by large U.S.
corporations over a 22-year period, 1973 through 1994. As we show, the effects of social network ties on firm financing differ across different periods. We argue that the variations in these effects over time were a consequence of the changing character of the pressures that firms faced from their capital suppliers and the capital market, and the means by which firms were expected to justify their decision making.
CORPORATE FINANCING AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY
Although economic sociologists and organizational researchers have become increasingly bold in terms of the firm strategies they have studied, there are some issues that are assumed to remain the purview of economists, and have therefore attracted little attention. One of these issues involves the ways in which firms manage their capital, that is, the basis on which firms determine their financing strategies. A small but growing literature on financing has recently emerged in sociology. Most of this work involves the analysis of credit and the effectiveness of credit-rating systems (Carruthers and Cohen 2001; Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001) or the acquisition of venture capital (Podolny 2001; Sorenson and Stuart 2001, although see Keister 2001) . Uzzi (1999) has examined the determinants of whether "mid-market" firms gain access to capital, as well as the interest rate on the funds they borrow. He has shown that the social relations between firms and their banks have significant effects on both of these variables. While Uzzi's concern is with whether middle-sized firms are able to acquire capital and if so, the price they pay for it, our study examines the largest U.S. corporations, for whom access to capital is less problematic. We focus on firms that are able to borrow, and for whom the level of external financing is a strategic decision. shipment or storage of goods, and to cover cash needs when long-term financing is unavailable. Much, although not necessarily all, of these funds come in the form of loans from commercial banks or commercial paper sold in public capital markets. Short-term debt can also include what is called trade credit, in which a supplier "lends" goods to the firm on the promise of future payment. Long-term debt is debt with a maturity date of more than one year. This form of debt tends to be for larger, more extensive projects such as expansion of production facilities or acquisition of another firm. Long-term debt has several forms, including privately-placed bonds (often handled by insurance companies), term loans (usually issued by commercial banks), and public bonds (typically placed by investment banks). Stearns and Mizruchi (1993a) provide a more detailed discussion of types of financing and the division of labor among financial institutions.
Although these different forms of external financing may have different purposes and different sources, each is ultimately the result of a decision by managers, whether the firm's chief financial officer or the chief executive officer (CEO) or alternative official.
Just as corporate managers make decisions on whether to acquire another firm, relocate a production facility, or adopt an alternative organizational structure, they also make decisions on how they will finance each of their activities. If adoption of the multidivisional form is a strategy, so is the use of long-term debt as opposed to equity.
As Barton and Gordon noted, "the question of how to finance the firm... represents a fundamental functional (financial) decision which should support and be consistent with the long-term strategy of the firm " (1987:67) .
Finance economists have paid considerable attention to the ways in which firms structure their financing. A huge literature has emerged, in which economists attempt to identify optimal levels of debt and equity under varying conditions. Empirical research on actual firm financing has yielded less clear results, however. Stewart Myers (1984) , in his Presidential address to the American Finance Association, put forth a model that is consistent with a considerable amount of organizational theorizing. Advancing what he called the "modified pecking order" theory, Myers suggested that given a preference, company public, thereby "cashing in" on the subsequent IPO. In other cases, firms have placed their subsidiaries in the public market as a means of generating funds. managers would apply internal financing, debt, and equity in that order. This hierarchy of preferences matched perfectly the level of managerial autonomy associated with them.
By using retained earnings, the firm retains the highest level of autonomy, since there is no other organization to place restrictions on the firm's use of its capital. The use of debt, on the other hand, renders the firm potentially subject to the dictates, or at least the influence, of the lender, since banks routinely place restrictive covenants on their loans.
These covenants, which may include limits on dividends paid to stockholders as well as restrictions on types of future debt, may restrict the firm's freedom of action. Equity creates an even greater potential loss of autonomy. If ownership becomes sufficiently concentrated, stockholders can begin to assert control over the firm's operation. As Useem (1996) has illustrated, this control has in recent years been more than hypothetical even for some of the largest American corporations.
Organizational theorists and transaction cost economists have maintained similar views regarding the use of internal financing. In the resource dependence model (Pfeffer and Salancik, [1978] 2003), firm managers will try to rely on internally generated resources to avoid dependence on external actors, in this case, banks and other financial institutions. In the transaction cost model (Williamson 1988) , managers try to avoid the use of external financing to the extent that the surrender of autonomy involved in their use exceeds whatever cost savings result. Because the use of internal financing removes the transaction costs involved in dealing with banks and other financial institutions, according to Williamson, firms will generally prefer this strategy. Both of these models yield predictions similar to those of the modified pecking order theory.
In a series of articles based on an analysis of 22 firms from 1955 through 1983, Stearns and Mizruchi (1993a; 1993b; Mizruchi and Stearns 1994) showed that firms' use of external financing was strongly affected by their level of retained earnings. In other words, firms that had high levels of cash tended to use it for their financing-regardless of the cost of capital. This finding is consistent with economic as well as organizational theory. The question that remains is whether a sociological approach can make a unique contribution to the study of corporate financing. Three findings from the Stearns and Mizruchi studies suggest that it can.
First, Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) showed, consistent with an argument by Fligstein (1990) , that firms whose CEOs had their functional backgrounds in the financial wing of the firm were more likely than were other firms to use high levels of external financing. This finding suggested that the strategic orientation of a firm's leader, shaped by his or her experiences and resulting worldviews, played an independent role in the firm's handling of its financing. Second, Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) also showed that firms that had representatives of financial institutions on their boards of directors used higher levels of external financing than did firms without financial representation on their boards. This finding was consistent with the view that firms' social network ties within the business community can have an independent effect on their economic behavior.
And third, related to the previous finding, Stearns and Mizruchi (1993a; 1993b) showed that the specific type of external financing a firm used, whether short-term debt, longterm public borrowing, or long-term private borrowing, could be accounted for by the specific type of financial representative who sat on the firm's board. Firms with commercial bankers (who specialize in short-term debt) on their boards used higher levels of short-term debt than did other firms. Firms with insurance company executives (who specialize in long-term private debt) on their boards used higher levels of long-term private financing than did other firms. And firms with investment bankers (who specialize in long-term public debt) on their boards used higher levels of long-term public financing than did other firms. These findings gave further specificity to the second one, by showing a match between a firm's behavior and the areas of expertise of its board members.
The Stearns-Mizruchi studies contained two important problems, however: First, the social network effect, which the authors sought to demonstrate as a means of showing that financing decisions were socially embedded, was tested in a highly indirect manner.
The authors assumed that the presence of a financial representative on a firm's board of directors conveyed information that led to a single, specific strategy: the use of higher levels of financing. It is certainly possible that the bankers on a firm's board will advise the firm to borrow, in the same way that surgeons have a tendency to recommend surgery. On the other hand, there is no assurance that bankers will recommend higher levels of debt.
2 Moreover, focusing only on the presence of financial representatives on a firm's board does not address the issue of whether a firm's borrowing, high or low, is affected directly by the behavior of the firms to which it is socially tied. Two bankers, each of whom sits on the board of a different firm, might suggest very different strategies for the two firms, while bankers who sit on two or more boards might convey similar types of advice to each.
The second problem with the Stearns-Mizruchi studies was a theoretical and epistemological one: Although the authors had time-series data covering a 28-year period (1956 through 1983) and although they examined the effects of several timespecific variables (such as interest rates and the stage of the business cycle), they assumed that the effects of both their financial and social embeddedness variables were constant over time, that is, invariant to changes in the historical context. Yet the period between the 1950s and the 1990s, on which both the earlier and current studies were based, saw a number of changes in the environments within which U.S. firms operated.
There was reason to question whether the determinants of external financing remained constant over time.
In recent years several historical sociologists have issued warnings against approaches that attempt to develop universal laws based on a comparison of historical cases (a partial list includes Isaac and Griffin 1989; Sewell 1996; Steinmetz 1998; and Paige 1999) . They argue that the conditions under which historical events occur are often so different that the factors that contributed to one event, such as a revolution, may have little resemblance to those that contribute to another. One need not agree with the idea of abandoning general theories to acknowledge that the effects of particular variables may vary across time. Such an approach has been explicit or implicit in a number of works in organizational and economic sociology. Hannan and his colleagues (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Carroll and Hannan 2000) , for example, have argued that the probability that a new organization will survive (that is, the effect of organizational age on organizational survival) varies depending on the stage of the population's development. Tolbert and Zucker (1983) 
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Two major approaches have dominated the recent literature on the diffusion of organizational strategies and structures: a neo-institutionalist model that focuses on the symbolic and cultural underpinnings of organizational behavior, and a social network model that emphasizes the social structural constraints and opportunities that shape organizational action. Organizational researchers have also incorporated ideas from political sociology as well as from neoclassical and institutional economics. In an earlier paper, Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) drew on these perspectives to develop a model of corporate financing. Drawing on this model, we posit three theoretically salient dimensions on which financing is based: the availability of internal funds; the strategic orientation of the firm; and the embeddedness of the firm's decision making apparatus.
We begin by briefly describing each of these dimensions here, positing the effects that we would expect to observe assuming a constant rate of impact across time. We then use this discussion to develop our hypotheses about the historical contingency of the effects of firm embeddedness.
boards is associated with relatively low levels of debt (Byrd and Mizruchi 2004 (Modigliani and Miller 1963) , and lucrative alternative investment opportunities for retained earnings (Herman 1981) . To show that borrowing corresponds to need, it is necessary to control for the cost of capital and the anticipated return based on a firm's recent performance. Stearns and Mizruchi (1993a) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) showed that even when these factors were controlled, the availability of retained earnings was a strong, negative predictor of a firm's level of borrowing. This suggests the following:
H1: The higher a firm's level of retained earnings, the lower its level of borrowing.
Strategic orientation of the firm. Both neoclassical and institutional economists believe that firms strive to maximize the efficiency of their operations and decisions.
Economists and economic historians such as Chandler (1977) , Williamson (1985) , and North (1990) (Fligstein 1990 ). Fligstein (1990) Among Fligstein's arguments is that the firm's conception of control will be reflected in the functional background of its chief executive officer. Firms that operate under a sales conception of control, for example, will tend to be led by CEOs whose origins were in the sales and marketing wing of the firm (or another firm). Fligstein also suggests that firms operating under a finance conception of control will have higher levels of external financing, a necessary component to their tendency to engage in frequent acquisitions (1990:15) . If this is the case, then firms whose CEOs come from backgrounds in a finance or accounting wing will have higher levels of external financing than firms whose CEOs originate in other functional areas. Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) found support for this suggestion in their study of the borrowing behavior of 22 large American corporations from 1956 through 1983. This suggests the following:
H2: Firms whose CEOs have functional backgrounds in finance or accounting will exhibit higher levels of borrowing than will firms whose CEOs have functional backgrounds in other areas.
Embeddedness of the firm's decision making apparatus. As we have seen, a basic tenet of economic sociology is the idea that the behavior of firms is socially embedded. We have argued that if this proposition is correct, then financing decisions by firms should also be interpretable at least in part by the firms' social ties with other firms.
The most commonly studied type of social tie between firms is the interlocking directorate, which occurs when a member of the board of one firm sits on the board of another. Interlocks have been shown to affect a wide range of corporate behaviors, including mergers and acquisitions, adoption of takeover defense strategies, adoption of the multivisional form, and political contributions (see Mizruchi 1996 , for a review of this literature). Director ties are not the only form of interfirm tie that researchers have examined. Other examples include interindustry and interfirm business transactions (Burt 1983; Mizruchi 1992; Uzzi 1996; Baker, Faulkner, and Fisher 1998) , common social club memberships (Kono et al. 1998; Marquis 2003) , and strategic alliances (Gulati 1995; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Stuart 1998; Ahuja 2000) .
Interlocks remain the most widely-studied form of interfirm tie, however.
Interlocks among the largest corporations provide a forum for officers of several major firms to meet. As board members discuss issues of relevance to the focal firm, those who sit on the boards of other firms have experiences and insights from which they can draw. Haunschild (1993) found that firms whose CEOs sat as outside directors on the boards of firms that had recently acquired another firm were more likely to engage in subsequent acquisitions themselves. Davis (1991) found that firms whose directors sat on the boards of firms that had recently adopted takeover defense plans known as "poison pills" were more likely to adopt a poison pill themselves. It appears that in both of these cases, the interlocks served as devices for the transmission of information. Exposure to the strategies of other firms increased the probability that firms would adopt similar strategies.
Given the potential for discretion in financing decisions, it is possible that just as ideas about acquisitions or structuring decisions may disseminate through interlocks, so might ideas about financing strategies. A firm's decision to embark on a major new venture, for example, will quite likely generate questions about financing. Various strategies for acquisition of capital would therefore be a logical subject for discussion at board meetings. We therefore suggest that the presence of shared directorships may have an effect on firms' borrowing. Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) addressed this issue indirectly, by examining the effect of the presence of representatives of financial institutions on the nonfinancial firm's board. They argued that bankers had a tendency to recommend that firms borrow, but also that they were able to help firms gain access to funds. Consistent with this argument, Mizruchi and Stearns found that the number of financial representatives on the board was positively associated with high levels of borrowing. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H3: Firms with greater numbers of representatives of financial institutions on their boards will have higher levels of borrowing than will firms with fewer such representatives.
Although the above finding on financial directors is consistent with the idea that firm behavior is affected by the social networks in which the firms are embedded, it provides only qualified support for this claim. First, it deals only with ties to financial institutions, despite the possibility that a firm could be influenced by its peers among nonfinancial corporations. Second, as we have noted, there is no reason that the influence of a firm's partners would have to result in higher, as opposed to lower, levels of borrowing. A firm might be influenced by a partner that had decided to reduce its use of debt at a particular point. At issue for the identification of a network effect, therefore, is the extent to which a firm's level of borrowing, whether high or low, is similar to that of its network partners. This suggests that:
H4: The amount that firms borrow will be similar to the amounts borrowed by the firms with which they are proximate in the network of interfirm ties.
Historically Contingent Effects
The above hypotheses are time invariant, meaning that they are assumed to be operative across different time periods. The period of our study, from the early 1970s through the early 1990s, witnessed a number of changes in the environment within which large corporations operated. U.S. corporations' use of external financing had increased significantly beginning in the mid 1960s, and remained high into the early 1980s (Stearns 1986 ). Beginning around 1983, firms' dependence on banks for their financing began to decline as firms found alternative sources of capital, and banks began to shift their focus away from lending (Davis and Mizruchi 1999) . It is not clear if, or if so, how, these changes would affect the determinants of borrowing. There is one development that may have had such an effect, however. In a dyadic analysis of financing behavior in five years-1973 , 1978 , 1988 -Mizruchi and Stearns (2003 found that in the years through 1983, pairs of firms that shared directors had more similar levels of borrowing than did pairs of firms that did not share directors. By 1988 this effect had disappeared.
Mizruchi and Stearns argued that this decline in the effect of interfirm networks reflected a shift in the culture of the banking and investment community in the U.S. that developed during the 1980s, reached full force in the later part of the decade, and continued into the 1990s. As described in detail by Useem (1996) , the decade of the 1980s witnessed an increased effort by the investment community, especially large institutional stockholders, to become more actively involved in the monitoring of firms in which they held stock. In the period from the end of World War II to the 1980s merger wave, outside members of corporate boards were rarely expected to ask probing, detailed questions of top officers (Mace 1971; Hirsch 1982; Lorsch and MacIver 1989) .
Corporate officers were more likely to explain their decisions in general, symbolic terms, largely free of the kind of monitoring that had characterized firms in the days of finance capitalism in the early 1900s. According to a number of observers, including Useem (1993; and Zajac and Westphal (2004) , this situation changed during the 1980s.
Stockholders and investors became more active, and managers became increasingly vulnerable, both in actual and perceptual terms. 3 Zajac and Westphal (2004) qualitative data that suggest an increasing management orientation toward shareholder value. Our own examination of the journal Financial Executive further confirms these findings. We looked at every issue of the journal from January 1973 through December 1994, the period of our data. Although there were few articles in any of the periods that directly advised company financial officers on how to structure their firm's debt levels, the period beginning in the early 1980s saw a growing number of articles focusing on the increasingly complex environments, as well as the increased scrutiny, that finance officers faced in the present, and were likely to face in the future. We also found several articles that advocated greater reliance on quantitative, and purportedly objective, criteria for determining the firm's capital structure, as opposed to, as one article termed it, "the perils of human judgment."
These developments suggest that managers found themselves subjected to increased scrutiny, or that they at least perceived themselves as less autonomous than in previous years. We argue that in the early years of our study, when firm financial executives were relatively free of the kind of external monitoring that occurred subsequently, firms were able to rely on informal communication with their peers in making their decisions regarding their capital structures. As managers faced increased scrutiny during the late 1980s and beyond, we argue that they came under greater pressure to justify their decisions on the basis of clear, seemingly objective, financial criteria. This placed more emphasis on the use of quantitative formulas specific to the firms' particular situations, and left less room for reliance on the informal information that passed through social networks.
Two arguments follow from this discussion: first, that the effects of social network factors on financing tended to decline over the period of our study; and second, that the key point of the shift, if it existed, was sometime in the mid 1980s. This suggests the following hypotheses:
H5a: The effect of interfirm network ties on firms' level of borrowing declined over time.
H5b: The effect of interfirm network ties on firms' level of borrowing was lower after the mid-1980s than in the prior period.
Additional Factors
In addition to our primary hypothesized effects on firm financing strategies, we consider five other factors: firm size, industry, recent performance, the firm's prior use of debt, and the issue of stock for the purpose of an acquisition.
Firm size. We are aware of no research that describes the relative use of external financing by size. Managerialist thinkers dating back to Berle and Means assumed that large size was associated with higher levels of profitability, which in turn led to increased retained earnings and less of a need for external financing. On the other hand, to the extent that they are in a stronger position than smaller firms, large firms might have easier access to capital. Because size is not necessarily correlated with performance, there is no assurance that size will be correlated with a firm's level of borrowing. Given the potential for variation in strategies among firms of different sizes, however, we shall include firm size as a control.
Industry. The effect of industry on the use of external financing is better established than the effect of size, since industries vary systematically in their production and distribution processes. The studies by Stearns and Mizruchi (1993b) and Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) revealed significant variation in borrowing across industries. Motor vehicle producers tended to be more likely than average to use short-term debt and less likely than average to use long-term public bonds, for example. Soaps and cosmetics firms were more likely than average to use long-term public bonds but less likely to use short-term debt. Aerospace firms used higher than average levels of total debt, while pharmaceutical firms used lower than average amounts. Clearly, there are significant differences across industries. We shall therefore include as controls dummy variables for the primary industries in which the firms operate. Prior debt. The amount that a firm borrows may depend in part on how much it has borrowed in the past. This could operate in two ways. On one hand, a firm that has recently taken on a significant amount of debt may be less likely to take on new debt. On the other hand, a firm that has a history of high usage of debt may continue to maintain a similar strategy. In either case, the level of new debt that a firm incurs cannot be assumed to be independent of the outstanding debt that the firm has from its previous actions. Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) found that a firm's debt ratio in the previous year was a consistently strong positive predictor of the amount of debt it took on in a given
year. This suggests we should account for the firms' prior debt ratios as a control.
Acquisitions. Finally, firms often issue stock for the purposes of an acquisition.
In such cases, the firm does not actually sell its stock on the market, but rather promises to transfer a certain number of its shares to the target firm as one means of payment.
Mizruchi and Stearns found a strong positive association between the amount of stock issued for the purposes of an acquisition and a firm's level of debt financing. This was probably a result of the fact that acquisitions require large sums of capital, and firms frequently raise considerable amounts of debt to finance their acquisitions. We therefore control for the amount of stock a firm issued for the purposes of an acquisition.
DATA AND MEASURES
The data for our analysis are derived from a 40-year time series, collected as part firm survived for the entire period, and had we complete data on every firm for every year, the data set would have included 8,000 company-year observations. The disappearance of firms and other missing data left us with a final total of 6,088 companyyears.
Because we have a sample of firms repeated yearly, the logical unit of analysis for our study is the company-year. This is the approach used by Stearns and Mizruchi in their earlier studies (1993a; 1993b; Mizruchi and Stearns 1994) . Because of the estimation technique that we used to examine the effects of our social networks, it is not possible to pool the data across years. Instead, we examined a series of cross-sections, one for each year of our study. The units of analysis are thus firms within a particular year, and we conduct separate analyses for each year. We explain our reasons for this below. Our tests of Hypotheses 5a and 5b are based on a time-series analysis in which our units are individual years, from which we compare the effects of particular variables over time. We also explain this below. Our dependent variable, firm borrowing, is the firm's new long-term debt and notes payable acquired in a given year. We standardized the variable by the firm's total assets. Retained earnings were computed as the sum of the firm's net income minus the sum of preferred and common dividends. This variable was also standardized by total assets. CEO background was treated as a dummy variable, coded 1 for background in finance or accounting and 0 for background in other areas. Financial representation on the board was coded as the number of individuals on a firm's board whose primary affiliations were with financial institutions. Our network variable, described in the following section, was based on board of director overlaps between the firms in our data set.
Firm size was computed as total assets. Debt ratio was computed as the firm's long term debt plus current liabilities, divided by total assets. Because both of these variables were highly right-skewed, we converted their values to logarithms (base e).
The firm's recent performance was computed, following Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) , as the product of the firm's mean profitability (return on assets) and growth (change in assets over prior assets) over the three years prior to the year in question. Industry created significant, and difficult to resolve, sample selection problems). The fact that we are dealing with "old economy" firms may render our findings more conservative, in that it may reduce the variation for several of our exogenous variables.
Given the time-series nature of our data, we considered the use of lags for all of our predictors. Recent performance is based on profit and growth rates for the previous three years so is lagged by definition. Although our dependent variable is not identical to the firm's debt ratio (because it is based on the level of new borrowing in a given year), the control for the previous year's debt ratio serves in part as a lagged endogenous it established a new interlock. The small number of cases in which this occurred ensured that this had virtually no effect on our results.
variable. We use contemporaneous measures for retained earnings, the presence of a CEO from a finance background, and the number of financial representatives on the firm's board. Published data on board membership and firm management are often a year old at press time, and these variables tend to be highly stable across individual years.
For retained earnings we determined that the amount of cash available to firms can change quickly enough that lagging the variable may leave too much lead time.
Our data came from three primary sources. All data on board members and CEOs 
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
Our data are organized in a pooled cross-sectional time-series format common in econometric analyses. Individual companies appear in consecutive years in the data, and the resulting units of analysis are company-years. The standard way to handle such a data set, when the dependent variable is continuous, is to use either a fixed effects model, with dummy variables for individual firms and years, or a generalized least squares (GLS) model that purges temporal and cross-sectional autocorrelation from the error term. The latter is the approach used by Stearns and Mizruchi (1993a; 1993b; Mizruchi and Stearns 1994) .
A problem presents itself in the current analysis, however. In the earlier study by Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) , the authors identified a network effect by charting the number of representatives of financial institutions on the firm's board. As we have seen, this approach was inadequate for two reasons: first, because it failed to account for the behavior of firms' peers, focusing instead only on financial representation; and second, because it ignored the possibility that interfirm influence could result in low as well as high levels of financing. In a subsequent study, Mizruchi and Stearns (2003) addressed this problem by examining interfirm dyads. This allowed them to directly examine the effects of network ties-they hypothesized that interlocked pairs of firms would behave more similarly-but it also made the examination of firm level effects extremely cumbersome-controlling for debt ratio, for example, meant examining whether pairs of firms with similar debt ratios would engage in similar levels of borrowing. The high number of observations that result from dyadic analyses, approximately three million were we to pool the current data into a single data set, also make a time-series analysis less feasible for our study.
An alternative to both of these approaches is to use a network autocorrelation The prior approach to spatial autocorrelation treats the autocorrelation between observations as a nuisance that requires removal so that the substantive predictors in the regression model will produce correctly estimated standard errors. The W matrix can also be treated as a substantively interesting variable, however, especially if one views the effects of relations among observations as worthy of estimation. In this model, W can be treated as a matrix of social relations among the actors, and a parameter, ρ, can be treated as an estimate of the effects of an actor's social ties on an outcome variable. The model that emerges from this approach is Y = ρWY + Xβ + ε, where ρ is a substantively interesting coefficient, along with the βs (Anselin and Hudak 1992; Doreian 1990) . What ρ represents is the effect of the behavior of the alters that are proximate to ego on ego's behavior. In our case, it represents the effect of the level of borrowing by the firms that are socially proximate to the focal firm on the focal firm's level of borrowing. There are a number of ways to estimate ρ. We use a maximum likelihood approach, available in version 8 of Stata (Pisati 2001) .
How the W matrix is defined has been a source of some controversy among network theorists (Leenders 2002) . The most important criterion is that the definition have a clear substantive basis. In our study, W represents a firm by firm matrix, the cells of which contain the "distances," that is, the number of steps, between each pair of actors. Two firms, i and j, that are directly interlocked receive a 1 in their ij and ji cells.
Two firms that are not directly interlocked but are connected through a common tie to a third firm (that is, are indirectly interlocked) receive a 2 in their cells. Firms that are separated by no fewer than two intermediate links receive a 3. Because the likelihood of actors having an influence over one another tends to decline sharply after two steps (Granovetter, [1974] 1995), we coded all separations of three or more steps as 3. There were few ties with distances of greater than three, but the distribution was sharply skewed at that point, so by capping the distances at 3 we also guard against individual observations having undue influence on our results.
Although our use of the network autocorrelation model represents a significant improvement over the methods used in the earlier Mizruchi and Stearns studies, it does create one problem: Because each network must be examined only in the year to which it applies, it is not possible for us to pool our data across years. Doing so would require us to create a W matrix that included firm-year to firm-year ties across all observations, including, for example, company A in 1973 with company B in 1994. Such an approach would be substantively meaningless as well as computationally demanding, assuming it were possible at all with existing software. The consequence of this problem is that our units of analysis must be firms, rather than firm-years, examined individually at each time point. We therefore compute separate regression models for each year of our data.
In addition to sharply reducing the number of observations in each of our analyses, this approach also prevents us from statistically testing for over time interaction (and thus historical contingency) in a pooled regression model. We can, however, take the results from our individual year regressions and run statistical analyses on the time-series data that result. We do this in our tests of Hypotheses 5a and 5b.
Before proceeding to our analyses, we must address one additional issue. The substantial attrition of firms over time raises the question of whether we are dealing with the same population of firms in the later years of our analysis as in the earlier years. This is especially significant given our hypotheses about the changing strength of the effects over time. The standard way to address this issue is with the use of a sample selection model (Heckman 1979; Berk 1983 ). In the standard Heckman model, one estimates a probit regression model, regressing the probability that the firm survives in a given year on a series of variables. From this equation one identifies a hazard rate of survival for each firm, which is then inserted into the substantive regression equation as an exogenous variable. If inclusion of the hazard rate does not affect the strength of the remaining predictors, selection bias is assumed to be unproblematic. In our data, the number of firms leaving the sample is relatively small in each year. This means that there are too few non-survivors in any given year to estimate a year-to-year selection equation. The alternative we chose was to estimate a selection equation for the first year of our data, 1973, with the probability of survival in 1994 (our last year of data) as our dependent variable. We then inserted the hazard rates from that model into our substantive equation for 1994. Because the Heckman model requires a probit equation, for which the network autocorrelation model is not available, it was necessary to remove the network variable from both our selection and substantive equations. Computation of the selection model is facilitated by including in the selection equation at least one variable that does not appear in the substantive equation. We used the firm's issue of new equity in the given year as our instrument. Our model (available on request) revealed that the hazard rate in the 1994 substantive equation was insignificant, and that its inclusion had no effect on the coefficients of the remaining variables. Table 1 presents 22 regression equations, one for each year of our data, containing the network autocorrelation models, with borrowing as the dependent variable and our firm level and network predictors as the independent variables. Because we are examining equations from 22 separate data sets, it is not feasible to present the summary statistics and correlations for each year. These data are available on request. Due to space considerations, we also do not include the coefficients for the industry dummy variables. These are also available on request. The presentation of individual equations means that there are two ways to evaluate our time invariant hypotheses (1 through 4):
RESULTS
we can examine each hypothesis for each individual year, or we can examine the signs of the coefficients for a given variable over the entire period and then compute the probability that the number of coefficients of that sign would have occurred by chance, using a χ 2 test. We used both of these approaches, but we focused primarily on the latter.
Our first hypothesis involved the role of retained earnings, which we predicted would have a negative effect on borrowing. The effect is negative in every year from 1973 through 1994, although the effects are statistically significant in only 15 of the 22 years. Given the relatively small sample sizes of the individual years, however, this finding suggests support for Hypothesis 1. The random probability that the effect would be negative in all 22 equations is less than .001 (χ 2 = 22.0 with 1 d.f.). The effects of the presence of a finance CEO and financial representatives on the firm's board (Hypotheses 2 and 3) do not fare as well. Although Mizruchi and Stearns (1994) found that both effects were strongly positive, the effects in our analysis are almost entirely null. In only one year for each variable does the coefficient have a probability of even less than .10 in the expected direction, 1978 for financial directors and 1986 for the presence of a finance CEO. Given that we examined 22 individual years, one would expect approximately one significant result purely by chance. Therefore, neither of these hypotheses receives support.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
One possible reason for the null effects of finance CEO and financial directors is that in this study we include the additional effect for network ties. The network effect reveals some very interesting patterns. Because our input into the W matrix was the distance between firms, Hypothesis 4 suggests a negative effect, since we argue that firms will be influenced by those that are relatively "close" to them in the network. To , which has a probability of less than .10, but not less than .05.
Historically Contingent Effects
Although we did not observe a statistically significant tendency for the network effects to be non-significant in the later period of our data, the nature of the network effects does appear to vary systematically over time. Moreover, as we shall see below, a casual "eyeballing" of the network effects gives a misleading picture of their actual trajectory over time. In Hypotheses 5a and 5b we suggested, based on changes in the environment within which corporate managers operated, that the effects of social networks on financing would decline in general over time, but especially after the mid 1980s. To test these hypotheses, we created a new data set in which our observations represent the 22 years from which our data were culled and our dependent variable is the size of the network effects for the individual years. The use of coefficients from one model as data in a second-stage model has a history in the economics literature dating back at least to the 1970s (see Saxonhouse 1976 for a classic discussion; Waring 1996 and Hornstein 2004 for applications). We discuss below some of the computational issues involved in these models.
Because we hypothesize that the effects of network ties on borrowing declined over time, our primary independent variable in these models is the year. We measure this in two ways. For our test of Hypothesis 5a we use the year itself in the equation, as a continuous variable. For our test of Hypothesis 5b we use a dummy variable that captures what we view as the two different external environments under which the firms operated: the managerial autonomy period (1973 through 1985) and the shareholder influence period (1986 and beyond).
We also control for the density of the network in the particular year, where density is defined as the number of existing direct interfirm ties in the network (coded in binary fashion, as 1 for existing and 0 for non-existing) divided by the number of possible ties, the latter computed as (N 2 -N)/2. As is evident from this formula, there is a tendency for density to decline with the increasing size of a network. Because the number of firms in our data declines consistently over time, the density tends to increase over time. We know of no existing analysis that examines the effect of network density on the effect of particular network ties on an outcome variable, and we believe that there is no intrinsic association between the two. 5 One can identify many cases in which network ties are strongly associated with an outcome variable in networks with few overall ties, as well as cases in which network ties are weakly associated with an outcome variable in networks with many overall ties. The extent to which network density affects the strength of the network effect therefore appears to be due entirely to the distribution of the outcome variable and its correlation with the ties among the actors.
There is reason on substantive grounds, however, to believe that there might be a positive association between network density and the size of the network effect. In their classic study of social influence, Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) showed that the more cohesive the social group, the greater the pressures toward uniformity of behavior.
This suggests the possibility that social ties among the firms will have a stronger effect on similarity of behavior to the extent that the overall level of cohesion in the group is high. It follows that we would expect to observe a positive effect of the density of the network in a particular year on the strength of the network effect on firm borrowing.
Although we include density primarily as a control, we shall also take note of whether its coefficient exhibits the predicted positive effect.
Our use of the continuous and dummy variable versions of year is designed to measure what we view as a shift in the environment within which corporate managers were operating, in particular, the external pressures facing managers. Although we believe that these pressures increased over time, especially after the mid 1980s, we also think it is helpful to include an alternative predictor, both as a validity check and also as a means of providing a more fine-grained account of the variation in our dependent variable. We therefore examine, as an additional measure of the environmental pressures facing managers, the total number of mergers that occurred in the entire economy in a given year. Although many of the firms in our sample were engaging in acquisitions as well as being the targets of them, even acquiring firms are often acting in a defensive manner, out of a concern of "eat or be eaten." This suggests that the level of merger activity is a good proxy for the volatility of the environment and the vulnerabilities that managers experience.
Because the 22 observations represent a time-series, it is necessary to check, and if necessary adjust, the data for autocorrelation. We did this using the Prais-Winsten GLS estimation technique (Ostrom 1990 ). The Prais-Winsten approach is identical to the widely used Cochrane-Orcutt technique, except that it provides an estimate for the first year of data, which would otherwise be lost because the previous year's observation is necessary to adjust the data for serial correlation of the residuals. In this approach, each ) and X to X* = X √(1-ρ 2 ) (Ostrom 1990:31). 6 In his discussion of the use of coefficients from one model as dependent variables in a second-stage model, Saxonhouse (1976) notes the possible presence of heteroskedasticity, since each observation is a coefficient with a unique sampling variance. To correct for this, Saxonhouse recommends a weighted least squares approach, in which one multiplies both sides of the second-stage equation by the inverse of the standard error associated with each coefficient (in our case the standard error of each ρ from the network autocorrelation model). An alternative means of correcting for heteroskedasticity is with the use of robust standard errors (Huber 1967; White 1980) .
We ran our analyses with both the WLS and robust standard error (hereafter "RSE")
approaches. Both yielded identical substantive conclusions.
We have chosen to report results using robust standard errors because unlike in weighted least squares, the RSE approach allows us to preserve the variables in their original form. Results from the WLS models are available on request. We present two sets of results using the RSE models. As a conservative approach, we begin by including the standard error of ρ on the right side of the equation, as a control. This should not be necessary given that the RSE adjustment corrects for heteroskedasticity, but we include it as a special precaution due to our small sample size. In a second set of equations we remove the standard error from the analysis.
The classic RSE model takes the generalized least squares formula for the variance-covariance matrix of the regression coefficients [(X'X) -1 X'ΩX (X'X) -1 ] and inserts e i 2 (the squares of the residuals from the computed regression) into the diagonal of Ω. MacKinnon and White (1985) raised questions about the viability of this approach for small samples and suggested a series of alternatives. Long and Ervin (2000) showed that one of these alternatives, [e i 2 / (1-h ii ) 2 ], where h ii is the leverage of observation i [the diagonal element of the matrix X (X'X) -1 X'], provided the most accurate standard errors when heteroskedasticity was present. Because significant heteroskedasticity was present in all of our equations that used ρ as the dependent variable, we used this modified RSE calculation in the models presented here. The results using this approach yielded larger standard errors, and thus more conservative inferences, than the alternative weights discussed by MacKinnon and White and Long and Ervin. 7 7 One possible source of heteroskedasticity is the presence of outliers in the data. We examined our data, both visually and with the calculation of leverage values and studentized residuals, and found no significant outliers. predicted directions for all of our effects, we use one-tailed statistical tests for all of our variables in these equations. We expect to observe negative effects for the year variables and mergers, and positive effects for density and the standard error. As is conventional for one-tailed tests, we shall treat any coefficient with a low probability value but in the opposite-from-predicted direction as non-significant. Table 3 includes the year as our predictor, which we hypothesize to have a negative effect, along with network density and the coefficient's standard error as controls. The results are consistent with our hypothesis. The T-statistic for year based on the robust standard error is -2.34 (p=.016), and this occurs in an equation with only 22
Time-Series Results

Equation 1 in
cases and three exogenous variables, all of which are highly correlated (the tolerance for year is .407). 8 Notice also that although the simple correlation between year and the network effect is close to zero and actually positive (.001), we achieve the predicted negative effect when we control for network density and the coefficient's standard error.
If we remove the standard error from the equation, the significant negative effect of year remains-the coefficient increases from -.362 to -.598, while the robust T statistic remains exactly the same, -2.34. The standard error, not surprisingly, has a positive association with the coefficient, although the T based on the robust standard error (2.05)
is considerably lower than that based on the unadjusted standard error (3.74). Network density also has the predicted positive effect, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In Equation 2 we insert the total number of mergers in the economy in a given year. Consistent with our prediction for year, we expect mergers to be negatively associated with size of the network effect, since we argue that the influence of social network ties on financing strategies was higher in periods when managers had a higher environmental pressure should be greater in those years. In other words, if our argument about the changing nature of the corporate environment is correct, then the effect of environmental pressures, as represented by the number of mergers, on depressing the network effect should be greater over time. To examine this, we created two interaction terms between year and the number of mergers, one using the continuous measure of year and the other using the dummy variable.
If our argument is correct, we should observe a negative interaction between year and mergers; that is, the effect of the number of mergers on the network effect should be increasingly negative in later years. Equations 6 and 7 of Table 3 present the results of these models. The results in both equations are consistent with our prediction. Despite enormous multicollinearity issues due in part to the presence of five exogenous variables in a model with only 22 observations, the interaction term of mergers with the continuous year measure has a T statistic of -1.94 (p=.035), and the interaction with the year dummy measure has a T statistic of -3.10 (p=.004). If we remove density from Equation 6, the T statistic for the interaction increases to -3.25, and if we reinsert density but remove the standard error, the T statistic increases to -3.24. These results support our suggestion that the extent to which environmental pressures on managers depressed the level to which they relied on their social networks became more pronounced over time.
Overall, our results provide consistent support for Hypotheses 5a and 5b, as well as our further suggestions about the role of mergers and the changing effect of mergers over time. Our analyses in this table were conservative in that we controlled for the standard error associated with each network coefficient. Not only did this reduce our residual degrees of freedom, but it added an additional predictor to our equations, increasing the probability of multicollinearity. In Table 4 we present seven equations identical to those in Table 3 , except that we do not include the standard error of the network coefficient as a control. We again use the modified computation of robust standard errors discussed above. Substantively, the results are virtually identical to those in Table 3 Table 4 and those in Table 3 . First, in Equation 5 of Table 4 , the effect of the year dummy variable is significantly negative, even when the number of mergers is included in the equation.
Second, the strength of the substantive predictors overall is greater in Table 4 than in Table 3 . The model R-squares, although considerably lower in the Table 4 models involving the continuous year variable, are nearly as high in the models involving the year dummy variable. Regardless of whether we include the standard error as a control, the weight of the evidence from both tables indicates that our primary hypothesis-that the effect of social network ties on firms' use of debt declined over time, and as managers faced greater environmental pressures-receives strong and consistent support.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have sought to accomplish two goals. First, we have attempted to establish that even in an area seemingly immune to social influences-firms' decisions regarding their use of debt-the firms' embeddedness in interfirm social networks can play a role in their financial decision making. Second, and more importantly, we have argued that the effects of a particular type of network-the social ties created by director interlocks among corporations-on firm financial behavior vary over time. In particular, we suggested that during the 1980s, the U.S. business community experienced a shift in the environment within which firm managers operated. Although corporations faced increased foreign competition and an increasing dependence on banks for capital during the 1970s, managers remained relatively free from monitoring by their stockholders in particular and the investment community in general. As we moved into the mid 1980s, however, stockholders began to pay more attention to the internal workings of their firms, and corporate managers became increasingly vulnerable, both to the possibility of being acquired, as well as to the general scrutiny of the capital market. This shift was accompanied by a new ideology, variously termed the "agency" (Zajac and Westphal 2004) or "shareholder value" (Useem 1993; Fligstein 2001) model, in which the most important goal of managers was to increase the firm's stock price, and all decisions had to be justified accordingly.
In the period of high autonomy, we argued, managers had a relatively high degree of discretion in their financing decisions. Under these conditions, their decision making was affected in part by the information they received informally from peers with whom they were socially connected. This argument about the changing nature of firms' external environments suggested that the effects of social network ties on managerial decision-making would change over time. Following from this suggestion, we hypothesized that the effects of social network ties on firms' use of debt would tend to decline over time, and that this decline would be most evident by comparing the pre-mid-1980s period with the subsequent one. Using data on approximately 140 large U.S. corporations over a 22-year time-series, we examined individual regression models for each year using a network autocorrelation model, in which we simultaneously measured the effects of firm-level variables and the effect of the behavior of the firms with which the focal firm was socially connected. Among our firm-level variables, the most consistent predictor of firms' use of debt over time was their retained earnings. As hypothesized, we found a negative (and in most cases statistically significant) effect of retained earnings on debt for all 22 years. In other words, ceteris paribus, firms tend to borrow when they lack available cash, and when they have high levels of cash they tend to eschew the use of debt. The effect of social network ties on firm financing varied over time, as predicted.
Although there was a slight tendency for the raw effect of social "closeness" on borrowing to decline in later years, a time-series analysis in which we took into account the changing structure of the networks over time revealed results strongly supportive of our contingency hypothesis: the strength of the network effect on firm financing behavior declined systematically over time.
It is crucial to emphasize that we are not saying that social networks are no longer important in understanding economic action. Our paper deals with one specific area of firm behavior, one that many observers would consider immune to social influences at any point. We are dealing with a specific sample, consisting largely of "old economy"
firms that were dominant in the mid-1950s. Our own work (Mizruchi and Stearns 2001) , based on data more recent than those used in this paper, indicates that social networks play a role in bankers' success in closing deals, and studies by several other researchers, including those cited in our introductory sections, have revealed similarly strong effects of social networks on behavior in the economic arena. Moreover, because the data we have presented end in 1994, we cannot speak to any changes that might have occurred in the late 1990s. This is especially significant given the wave of corporate scandals at the turn of the century, in which the monitoring of management appeared to be quite low.
We make no assumption that the changes that we posited during the period of our study represent a linear, or even monotonic, historical trend. Indeed, some authors have argued that managerial autonomy has fluctuated in a cyclical fashion over the past century (Stearns 1986; Useem 1993) . Our key finding, and conclusion, remains, however: Just as network effects may vary by demographic groups or the type of network examined, they may also vary, within the same group and the same type of network, across historical time. z statistics in parentheses; + p < .10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p<.001; probabilities involving the network effect, retained earnings, financial directors, and finance CEO are one-tailed; all others are two-tailed; industry dummy variables are omitted to conserve space. 
